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Food policy often depends on markets and markets 
depend on institutions. But how good do institutions 
have to be before reforms can be launched? Relying on 
well timed surveys of agricultural prices and a joint study 
by the Government of Bulgaria and the World Bank 
on agricultural market institutions, this paper presents 
evidence that performance in food markets improved 
following significant policy reforms in Bulgaria, although 
public institutions remained weak. This suggests that 
even though strong institutions are preferred to weak 
This paper—a product of the Sustainable Rural and Urban Development Team, Development Research Group—is part of 
a larger effort in the department to understand how policies affect food markets in developing countries. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at DLarson@
worldbank.org.  
ones, it can be costly and impractical to delay policy 
reforms until work on strengthening institutions is 
finished. Still, measured performance varied by place 
and by commodity, suggesting that markets developed 
at different tempos and that the distribution of benefits 
from improved markets was uneven. This points to 
the need to address the costs of adjustment as policies 
change. The paper introduces a new approach to 
measure market performance based on composite-error 
techniques.THE PERFORMANCE OF BULGARIAN FOOD MARKETS DURING REFORM 
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THE PERFORMANCE OF FOOD MARKETS IN TRANSITION: THE CASE OF 
BULGARIA 
1  Introduction 
Even though governments intervene in food markets in significant ways, most food policies rely 
substantively on markets. Within a given policy framework, markets are called upon to signal 
incentives and to price risk. In addition, market outcomes are often used to measure the success of 
policy. For many countries this current reliance on markets represents a transition from earlier 
regimes in which the state took primary responsibility for pricing and sometimes for the physical 
distribution of food. The focus of this paper, Bulgaria’s decision to reduce direct interventions in 
food markets in favor of a market-reliant system, is a case in point and illustrates a prevalent feature 
of shifting economic policies during the latter half of the twentieth century. 
In the transitional economies of Eastern Europe and countries of the former Soviet Union, 
the shift to market-based food systems was part of a comprehensive restructuring of national and 
regional economies. The reforms, and especially the reforms to agriculture, were pursued with 
varying levels of completeness that reflected uneven political consensus and differences in donor 
leverage. Nevertheless, more than a decade after the reforms were begun, there remains a commonly 
expressed view that the costs of adjustment were higher than expected and the benefits of reform 
slow in arriving because the markets upon which the new policies depended were not up to the task.1 
This criticism relates to the ability of governments to implement reforms, but is more fundamental. 
Specifically, a reasonable argument is made that, since efficient markets rely heavily on effective 
publicly backed institutions, the potential benefits of market-based reforms cannot be fully realized 
until market-supporting institutions can be built up. And, while market reforms often create new 
incentives and new opportunities, institutions related to property rights, contract enforcement and 
dispute resolution remain largely the province of governments that are subject to other incentives 
and competing demands. For this reason, some argue that the pace of reform should be slowed to 
match an adequate build-up of public institutions.2  
To make this policy practical, some indication of the readiness of markets is needed. 3 
Assessing the capacity of public institutions may not directly reveal the ability of markets to perform 
however since there is good reason to think that the building up of markets is partly an endogenous 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Kydd and Dorward (2001) and references therein. 
2 Ashley and Maxwell (2001) argue that institutions need to be in place before market-dependent policies are introduced. 
Maxwell (2005) includes a related discussion with reference to the rural development strategies of the European Union, the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the 
World Bank 
3 The same could be said for the readiness of institutions. Using examples from Bulgaria, Dimitrova (2002) discusses the 
difficulties of basing policy on judgments about institutions in the context of EU enlargement. process in which participants find effective ways to make use of existing limited institutions and, 
importantly, to build substitutes for public institutions based on private associations and private 
networks. To the degree that this is so, market reforms that rely on imperfect private substitutes for 
public institutions may nevertheless create expanded opportunities for trade. 
Against this background, our paper takes up the question of whether policy reforms that 
create new incentives and opportunities can give rise to better performing markets, even when public 
institutions remain weak. The paper relies on three well timed surveys of agricultural prices in 
Bulgaria. The first survey took place in 1995 just prior to the 1996 economic crises that would 
eventually result in a new government and new policies. The second took place in 1997 just prior to a 
series of agricultural policy reforms that led to the full liberalization of agricultural prices in 1998. 
The third took place in 2001, following a four-year period when agricultural policies were stable and 
market-based, but when related institutions remained weak. We also introduce a simple way to 
measure changes in the performance of spatial markets when information on the underlying 
determinants of transfer costs is unavailable. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes events and 
policies related to food market reforms in Bulgaria during the study period. In section 3, a conceptual 
model is developed to describe markets that range in their level of completeness and efficiency and 
an applied version of the model is specified. The data is discussed in section 4. Section 5 contains 
estimation and simulation results and section 6 concludes. 
2  Background 
Following the fall of the communist government in 1989, Bulgaria began a process of integrating its 
economy and institutions with the European Union. Eventually in this process, Bulgarian policy 
would focus on the transformation of institutions and the building-up of administrative capacity, 
driven largely by the need to take up and implement the European Union’s acquis communautaire as a 
condition of EU membership (Preston 1997; Dimitrova 2002). However, for most of the period 
between 1989 and the start of negotiations for EU membership in 2000, policy reform in Bulgaria, 
though uneven, centered on freeing up markets and building private ownership rather than 
developing institutions. This is particularly evident in the related set of policies that influenced food 
markets during the seven year period covered in this study.4 
Political uncertainty marked much of the first decade of reform in Bulgaria and this was 
reflected in uncertain and inconsistent economic policies. Early on, as the restructuring of the 
                                                 
4 While the broad criteria for Bulgaria’s eventual membership in the EU was laid out by the Copenhagen European Council 
in 1993, Dimitrova notes that the European Union’s emphasis on institutions and administrative capacity began around 
1997. 
  2economy began and unemployment rose, many Bulgarians retreated into the agricultural sector, 
where labor productivity fell and on-farm production strategies shifted to emphasize subsistence.  In 
February 1991, a transitional coalition government launched a broad set of policy changes that 
included agricultural trade and price liberalization with the intention of boosting food supplies. 
However, the policies were rendered ineffectual by subsequent interventions, beginning a six-year 
period of irresolute policy-making. During this time, food policies were short-lived and uncertain. 
For example, a long-standing policy of fixing prices for basic agricultural commodities was lifted in 
1991, but a series of alternative controls were soon adopted in order to slow raising food costs. The 
controls included minimum procurement prices and recommended retail prices. In 1993 ceiling 
prices were introduced. In 1995, a State Fund for Agriculture was established and charged with 
stabilizing prices, although the Fund was given insufficient resources to do so. 
 By 1996, little progress had been made toward key reforms to Bulgaria’s agriculture sector 
and the state remained a dominant player in the domestic grain market. Private markets were 
hindered by erratic sales and purchases from the State Grain Reserves, a lack of uniform grades and 
standards, and an ever changing trade regime characterized by ad hoc export bans thrown up in 
response to changing food prices (Mergos et al., 2001). Government interventions in related land, 
water, and credit markets hampered progress as well– a problem that was further exacerbated by the 
concurrent restructuring of Bulgaria’s major trading partners in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union.5 
Following a deepening economic crisis, a grain shortage and widespread bank failures in 
1996, a new government was elected to office in 1997. In 1998, agricultural price controls and trade 
restrictions were lifted as part of a comprehensive reform program. The program was backed by a 
World Bank loan in 1999, and plans were made for a follow-on loan.6 In preparation, studies were 
commissioned on key aspects of the Government’s program for agriculture, including strategic grain 
management, rural finance, land markets, forests, and food safety. 
Principally, the studies found that reforms begun in 1998, though substantial, were 
incomplete.7 The studies also suggested a need to “move beyond standard liberalization and 
privatization reforms toward measures to build market institutions” (World Bank 2002, p. 3). A 
second World Bank loan, approved in June 2001, together with on-going funding from the EU, was 
                                                 
5 See Deininger (2002) on the general problem of land reform in Eastern Europe; Lerman (2001) discusses the broad 
problems of agricultural reforms among the transitional countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Mishev, 
Tzoneva and Ivanova (1998), Csaki, Nash, Fock and Kray (2000), and Mergos, Stoforos, Mishev and Ivanova (2001) review 
agricultural policies and food markets in Bulgaria.  
6 The two lending operations were: Agricultural Structural Adjustment Loan (PO 57925), approved on June 22, 1999 and 
Agricultural Structural Adjustment Loan II (PO 57926), approved on June 6, 2001 (World Bank, 2002). 
7 Other sectors important to food markets were subject to inconsistent policies and an incomplete reform process. See, for 
example, Miller and Petranov (2000).  
  3intended to support already-begun policy reforms and to additionally strengthen a set of institutions 
judged to be weak. More specifically, the loan backed efforts to strengthen laws and property rights 
related to agricultural land and forest lands situated on private property. The loan also included 
provisions design to facilitate the privatization of food processing and related state-owned 
enterprises, and to put in place legal and regulatory frameworks related to: seed, fertilizer and 
pesticide markets; inventory-based financing (through warehouse receipts); and irrigation systems.  
Transport policies 
Coincident with agricultural reforms were a series of policy and investment decisions that affected 
the transport component of food markets in Bulgaria. In this regard, opening of trade and the freeing 
of domestic markets during the already mentioned 1991 reforms was crucial because it brought about 
a reorientation of trade flows and, with it, a restructuring of the Bulgarian transportation sector. This 
occurred primarily through the emergence of small transport business and external competition 
rather than changes in basic infrastructure or the privatization of public enterprises.8 Fuel costs, an 
important component of transport costs, rose during the study period.9 Moreover, as with food 
markets, institutional changes relating to transport markets also occurred late in the reform process. 
 For example, significant restructuring of the railroad did not take place until the passage of 
the first Railway Law in November 2001.10 A second law, passed in early 2002, created a regulatory 
body and opened the market for transport services. At the same time, rail transport became 
increasing less relevant to the changing Bulgarian economy and goods carried by rail declined by 
nearly 61% between 1990 and 2000 (World Bank 2006a; World Bank 2006c). Similarly, despite the 
emerging importance of road transport, little was done to improve Bulgaria’s national road system or 
the agency charged with its management until late in the reform process. Externally funded projects 
to improve the road system began around 1994 but centered on the 3,300 kilometers of Class I roads 
that carried international traffic.11 For the most part, maintenance efforts were under-funded and 
proved inadequate. As a consequence, by 2005, only one-third of Bulgaria’s national roads were in 
good condition.12 Efforts to improve the nearly 4,000 kilometers of regional and district (Class II and 
                                                 
8 The Bulgarian ground transport network included roughly 4,300 kilometers of rail and 37,000 kilometers of roads in 1990 
and in 2001 (World Bank 2005; World Bank 2006a). 
9 By 1992, petroleum prices in Bulgaria were linked to international prices via a cost-plus pricing formula (World Bank, 
1992). In constant US dollars, international prices for crude oil rose about 8% between 1995 and 1997, and rose by more 
than 18% between 1997 and 2001 (World Bank, 2006a). Excise taxes on gasoline, initially low, were raised in 1996 and the 
phase-out of less expensive leaded gas began in 1998 (Malý, Jakubes, Jilková and Snajdrová, 2002). 
10 The law mandated the separation of the Bulgarian State Railway into two separate enterprises; one in charge of 
infrastructure and the second in charge of freight and passenger services. 
11 Roughly 19,000 of the 37,000 kilometers of Bulgaria’s roads are national roads managed by the Road Executive Agency 
(REA). The remaining roads are managed locally by cities and towns. 
12 Policies to insure targeted funding for road maintenance were slow to emerge, although a significant step was taken with 
the establishment of a vignette system in 2004. 
  4III) roads that serve small towns and rural areas were largely delayed until 2006 (World Bank 2005; 
World Bank 2006b.) 
Even though the quality of large portions of the physical transportation infrastructure 
declined during the study period, several important policy changes did occur between 1997 and 2001 
that likely facilitated spatial markets generally. These included an acceleration privatization of 
transport firms and the development of licensing program that addressed uncertainty over safety.13  
Policy evaluations 
Some germane characteristics of the Bulgarian reform process are captured by the measures given in 
table 1.  The first rows of the table report transition indicators constructed by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, 2007), while the later rows provide some related 
indicators of economic performance. The time periods reported correspond to the surveys used in 
our analysis.  
The transition indicators are evaluations of milestones of market reform and range from 1 to 
4.33. The privatization scores are average based on the pace of the privatization of small and large 
enterprises. A score of 2 indicates the development of privatization plans and the beginnings of some 
sales; a score of 3 indicates that 25 percent of large enterprise assets are sold or ready for sale and 
that a comprehensive sale of small enterprises in underway. The finance indicator is an average of 
banking, securities and related reforms. A score of 2 indicates a liberalization of interest rates, the 
start-up of securities exchanges and rudimentary legal reform. A score of 3 would indicate full 
interest rate liberalization, significant lending to the private sector, progress on bank regulatory 
oversight, the emergence of non-bank financial services and an active and regulated securities market. 
The infrastructure measure is based on reforms covering electric power, railways, roads, 
telecommunications, water and waste water services. A score of 2 indicates weak commercial 
objectives and political interference in setting tariffs; some decentralization of decision making. 
Market reforms are based on progress toward the removal of non-tariff trade restrictions, the 
elimination of price controls outside of housing transport and natural monopolies, with a score of 
4.33 consistent with European Union standards. A competition score of 2 indicates the startup of 
competition policy legislation and some reduction of entry restrictions; some actions are taken to 
limit the market power of dominant firms. 
                                                 
13 As elsewhere in the Bulgarian economy, privatization efforts stalled early in the reform process. In 1997, 233 state-owned 
enterprises provided freight and passenger service. However, by 1999, all but 23 had been privatized and by 2001 private 
businesses handled 90% of international freight haulage. Moreover, a series of laws beginning in 1997 introduced EU safety 
standards, along with inspections and licensing. This reduced uncertainty over the safety of Bulgarian transport companies 
in the domestic market and, importantly, the international market. 
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paced reforms in other areas that depended on more specific legislation and the building up of 
institutions. Still, significant progress was made by 2001 in containing inflation, expanding phone 
service and improving the overall energy efficiency of the economy – steps that are supportive of 
domestic markets. 
Surveys 
During this period of ongoing policy changes, three nationally representative surveys were conducted 
that asked about food prices. The first survey took place in 1995, prior to the banking crises. The 
survey was repeated in 1997, just prior to the 1998 reforms and again in April and May of 2001, just 
prior to an extended period of institutional reform. Of chief interest is the period between the 
second and third round of surveys, since it is during this interlude that food market reforms were in 
place but market institutions were judged weak. At the same time, the 1997 survey came on the heels 
of widespread economic disruption. Consequently, differences in market performance between 1997 
and 2001 are potentially attributable to the singular effects of establishing economic stability rather 
than the related effects of an endogenous development of food markets. For this reason, we make 
use of the 1995 survey round as well. Together, the three representative surveys allow an evaluation 
of the combined effects of the set of policy reforms that began in early 1998 against the background 
of the weak institutions that motivated further lending by the World Bank and the European Union 
in 2001, and against a 1995 pre-crises benchmark of food market performance.14 
3  The model 
Descriptively, the model starts with the notion that, at any point in time, commodities are stored and 
offered for sale at spatially diverse locations. The locations are connected by information and 
distribution systems that collectively comprise a market network. Associated with the network are 
sets of pair-wise transfer costs relating geographically distinct markets. Some components of overall 
transaction costs relate to distance or other fixed characteristics of the trading pair. Other 
components relate to specific characteristics of the traded commodity, such as storability or the ease 
by which quality can be determined. Other aspects, such as changes in policy, relate to time. 
Consequently, spatial, temporal and commodity characteristics are expected to play a role in 
determining observed price spreads. The estimation strategy then is to separate out the components 
of markets that remain fixed and unaffected by policy from the components that policy can change. 
                                                 
14 More information about the surveys can be found on the internet at: http://www.worldbank.org/LSMS/ . Annex table 1 
provides a chronology of major political events in Bulgaria during the study period. 
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prices for the same good should differ by no more than the full cost of transacting an exchange 
between the markets. Consequently, any equilibrium outcome among markets will be characterized 
by the multiple idiosyncratic relationships between trading partners that reflect location specific 
storage and transaction costs. From the perspective of an agent operating in a specific location, this 
solution presents itself in the form of a large number of potential trading relationships, only a few of 
which are actualized. 
Although the general equilibrium outcome among markets at a given point in time is 
described by the pair-wise price conditions, a variety of factors condition the general multi-market 
optimization problem. Significant policy reform can change the general problem and consequently 
give rise to different patterns of trade. In the instance of trade reform, this comes about because 
trade patterns that are optimal may have been previously precluded by policy. Policy is expected to 
directly and indirectly affect transfer costs as well since some components of transfer costs are public 
or club goods. For example, institutional changes, whether induced by changing incentives or 
supported through policy, are expected to lower transaction costs, especially those related to 
contracts and information, and in the longer term, to improve the environment for cost-reducing 
private investments. Similarly, complementary public investment in infrastructure can reduce transfer 
costs as well. 
Even so, more efficient trade does not mean that observed price differences between market 
locations will necessarily decline or that movements in prices will be more closely correlated. It can 
be the direct goal of market-constraining policies to minimize price differences among regions and 
price variation can also be an outcome of monopolistic pricing. Additionally, indirect effects from 
other market reforms -- for example a reducing in fuel subsidies -- can increase transfer costs and 
lead to wider price margins.  
Nevertheless, food policies are most often incentive-based and reforms are undertaken with 
the expectation that spatial markets will be less isolated and price transmission across markets will 
improve. With these policy objectives in mind, the applied model below is designed to measure 
general indications of these types of change. 
Applied model  
As discussed, for a given set of initial conditions, a set of trade relationships emerge among trading 
partners. Though the eventual pattern of trade is determined taking into account the entire set of 
potential trading relationships, the relationship between any two locations can be described by the 
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one of three ways for each market dyad. In the first instance, the following arbitrage equality holds: 
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where  12   is a positive slack variable. In this case, trade does not take place because demand in 
location 1 can be met in less costly ways. A third possible outcome is written as   
where , or equivalently as: 
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where  12   is also a non-zero slack variable representing missed arbitrage opportunities or constraints 
that prevent the use of least-cost transfer techniques.16 
From the perspective of a given set of price dyads  , where  , the potential 
relationships can be summarized in terms of a single price-distance equation: 
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  i 2 m 0  
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0 2 2  i i   . Were transfer costs easily measured, a solution describing the optimal distribution 
of supplies across markets and associated slack variables could be found using a variety of 
programming algorithms. Alternatively, when observations on the determinants of 
* T  are available, it 
may be possible to estimate an approximating function.  
In the empirical section that follows, we consider price distances relationships across several 
regions and several commodity markets, and this requires a slightly extended notation. For the 
purposes of developing the applied model, we denote a particular spatial market relationship by the 
triad  , where   represent the location of a potential exporting community, where   represent 
the location of a potential importing community, and c  represents a commodity.  We set up the 
problem from the perspective of an importing agent who chooses among several potential sources of 
supply for a particular commodity. Defining market clusters  , we represent the associated price 
distance between any two locations at a given time 
) , , ( c j i i j
) , ( c j s
t  as  0    ict sit P m jct P , for all   where  j i, j i  . 
                                                 
15 Most modern models of spatial integration are derived from Samuelson’s (1952) formalization of Enke’s (1951) 
descriptive solution and subsequent extensions by Takayama and Judge (1964). 
16 Constraints related to storage markets can also produce this outcome, although we rule out this possibility by using prices 
that are observed together with available supplies. See Larson (2007) for a unified discussion of storage and spatial arbitrage 
conditions. Brennan, Williams and Wright (1997) for a numerical example of how storage and production seasonality can 
affect trading patterns. 
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characteristics that remain fixed in the analysis.  
With this notation in place and the above discussion in mind, the set of equilibrium 
outcomes can be written as: 
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In anticipation of future discussions, note that arbitrage forces will work to minimize   but 
not  . Consequently, when all spatial arbitrage opportunities are exploited,   is non-negative. 
Moreover, note that when markets become more integrated in the sense that arbitrage takes place 
among a larger number of market pairings, the number of observations for which  0  sit   
increases.17 
Dealing with missing information on transfer costs 
In practice, researchers often have observations on prices at different locations and information on a 
set of policies expected to affect trade and transfer costs. However, the full set of transportation, 
transaction and transformation costs that comprise transfer costs are difficult to observe directly and 
the underlying determinants of transaction costs are observed partially. Consequently, a key 
component of market integration studies is a strategy to deal with missing information on transfer 
costs or their determinants. In general this is done by describing the variation in spatial price 
distances through time. In some cases, the measured price difference is conditional on a partial list of 
observed determinants – for example transport costs. But most commonly the effects of policy are 
expected to work through unobserved determinants. The purpose of the modeling effort then is to 
describe the variation in price distances through time to determine whether outcomes are consistent 
with the expected policy outcomes. A practical consequence is that most empirical studies of spatial 
markets are based on the temporal price variation centered on a particular price-pair, or a set of 
price-pairs.18 
In terms of the general notation adopted above, the focus of many pair-wise studies is the 
between-time relationship  , where the spatial relationship is fixed and  t t t T m   
*   is approximated 
                                                 
17 Put somewhat differently, prices are more often transmitted from one market to the next when the number of pairings 
with zero-valued slack variables increases. 
18 Fackler and Goodwin (2001) provide a good review of the time-series models and results. See also recent studies by 
Negassa and Myers (2007) and by Balcombe, Bailey and Brooks (2007) and references therein. 
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two locations   are chosen for study based on a priori knowledge about existing trade patterns 
and two boundaries are identified by approximating transfer costs,  and  . Observations 
that fall outside the boundaries are modeled as   and  . A 
distributional assumption is made regarding the idiosyncratic terms -- normally one in which the 
) 2 , 1 (
) ( 12 t x T
) (t
) ( 21 t x T
( ˆ ) ( 21 t T t  ) ( ˆ ) ( 12 12 12 t T t m    ) ( ) 21 21 t m  
) (t   
are modeled using a half-normal distribution – which provides a way of estimating the probability 
that prices remain within the boundaries associated with transfer costs or outside them. In some 
models, an additional structure is imposed on the  ) (t   to test whether there are tendencies for prices 
outside of the two thresholds to move back to threshold levels with time.  
Pair-wise threshold models are well suited to studying discontinuities along major trading 
routes and the seasonality of agricultural markets. However, they are less well suited to studying 
policy shifts that are expected to remove constraints on trade or significantly affect transfer costs. 
This is because, as discussed, such policies are likely to engender new trade relationships. In such 
cases, trade between a given pair may be discontinuous because of events in other markets even 
when transfer costs are unchanged.19 Said differently, in times of significant policy shifts, changes in 
the   may be partly or fully determined by events in other markets. In this case, the location of the 
relevant boundary points can shift as can any systemic auto-regressive patterns related to  . 
In this paper, we employ a modified threshold strategy that considers relative price 
differences among clusters of markets. The approach provides a way to jointly estimate the location 
of the boundary points and implied transfer costs in multiple markets and provides a measure of how 
market performance has changed over time. The logic behind the strategy is illustrated in figure 1, 
which represents the relationship between the equilibrium price in an importing center   and prices 
in potential exporting centers  . In the first case, the price arbitrage condition holds exactly, 
and the price distance   exactly equals the associated transfer cost  . In the second 
market,   also lies on the transfer cost frontier, but is measured with error  . The third 
observation lies beyond the frontier by a distance  , which is made up of the slack variable 
j
( j s T
3
3 , 2 , 1  i
c 1 jc p p  ) ,c
jc e2 c p2
jc v3 jc   
and the measurement error e . The estimation problem then is finding a way to separate an 
estimate of the transfer costs   from the idiosyncratic slack variables and measurement errors using 
the limited information contained in the price data alone. 
jc 3
s T
                                                 
19 Samuelson (1952) gives a numerical example. 
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With this in mind, first note that when transfer costs are approximated,  
* T   , where e is an 
estimation error. In this case the estimated boundary condition becomes  . Since 
neither 
e x T  ) ( ˆ
v    ˆ e  T m
  nor   are observed, the distance from the boundary condition can be thought of as a 
comprised error containing the non-negative idiosyncratic term 
e
  and a random error term  . As it 
turns out, the components of the comprised error can be separately estimated, based on an 
assumption about the underlying distributions. In our applied model, we continue to maintain the 
usual boundary-model assumption that 
e
  can be approximated using the half-normal distribution. 
This, in addition with the assumption that approximations of the threshold point contain an error   
that is distributed normally, results in composite normal-half-normal specification for  . 
e
v
The amount of information contained in price data alone is limited and it is useful to 
describe the sources of variation in our panel of markets more precisely. Following Mundlak (1978), 
let W  and   be symmetric and idempotent projection matrixes that generate residuals. For an given 
vector   of order ST:  , 
B
m ) ( .. m m Wm st   ) ( ) ( .. . m m m s B s   ,  ) ( ) ( .. . m m m t B t   , and 
, where the sub-scripted dot represents an average over the relevant 
index. When the panel is balanced, several orthogonal relationships hold, including: 
) .. . m t  (mst ) (st . m m W s   m 
    Wm m st W m t B m s B ) ( ) ( ) (     3.5) 
The relationship is axiomatic and exhausts the variation in  . However, the relationships 
can also be exploited to say something about the distribution of unobserved components, since 
variation in price distances   are decomposed into average time-invariant effects across markets, 
, that are separated from the systemic and idiosyncratic components that change with time, 
and   respectfully. For the purposes of evaluating policy, the above decomposition 
distinguishes between differences that have to do with fixed characteristics of the market pairs and 
those that potentially vary with policy and time. 
m
m
m s B ) (
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When all markets are observed for all periods and the panel is balanced, the idiosyncratic 
within-in terms can be calculated directly. Otherwise, the relationship can be approximated from a 




  sit t s sit w m       3.6) 
where   are interpreted as an estimate of the systemic change in transaction costs over markets and 
over time. The estimates are unbiased as long as the normal OLS assumptions hold. In the context of 
                                                 
20 In the balanced-panel case, the OLS residuals are identical to the calculated within-market-time effects. 
  11our model, this is most likely when the model is applied to large liquid markets, where the arbitrage 
condition is expected to hold as an equality.21 In the general case, when the arbitrage condition 
sometimes holds as an inequality, it is possible to find better estimates, conditional on an additional 
assumption about the distribution of the idiosyncratic slack variables. 
With this in mind, we estimate a generalized version of 3.6: 
  sit t s sit v m       3.7) 
where   e v    , and where   and  .  Specified in this way, the model can 
be estimated using stochastic frontier estimation techniques.
) , 0 ( ~
2




22 Note that 3.6 is a special case of 3.7 
that holds when  . Non-parametric programming techniques can also be used to estimate 3.7, 
although Coelli et al. (2005) discuss reasons why the approach used in this paper is preferred when 




Before proceeding to a description of the data, it is useful to introduce two potential problems that 
are addressed in the empirical section. The first has to do with the prevalence of opportunities for 
spatial arbitrage. The modeling approach relies on the assumption that the idiosyncratic slack 
variables are largely positive in order to separate the idiosyncratic asymmetric   from the random  . 
Unexploited arbitrage opportunities result in negative slack variables and if they are frequent in the 
data, the distinction between the two idiosyncratic terms in the composite error blurs. From the 
perspective of the estimated model, the issue can be viewed as part of the more general problem of 
specifying an appropriate composite error. The general problem is much discussed in the stochastic 
frontier literature and related statistical tests have been devised to resolve the issue empirically. We 
return to this topic when presenting the empirical results. 
e
The second issue concerns unobserved markets. As discussed, when not all price 
relationships are observed, there is potential for misidentifying the price relationships that define the 
trade boundaries. This is an ever-present problem in spatial pricing studies. Making use of clusters of 
spatial prices arguably makes more extensive use of information about relative pricing. Even so, this 
does not preclude the possibility that key market relationships are missing. At root is whether or not 
the data generated by the underlying surveys is sufficiently detailed to support the analysis. This 
concern cannot be completely resolved; however, as a precaution, we employ bootstrapping methods 
                                                 
21 See Mundlak and Larson (1992) for a related example. 
22 For early discussions of stochastic frontier models see early Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), Meeusen and van den 
Broeck (1977), and by Battese and Cora (1977). Good overviews are given in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003) and Coelli, 
Rao, O’Donnell, and Battese (2005). 
  12when generating standard errors for key parameters, which allows us to check whether the results 
derived from the available data are sensitive to the random exclusion of markets within our sample. 
4  Data 
As mentioned, prices used in this study were taken from the 1995, 1997 and 2001 Bulgaria Integrated 
Household Surveys. The 1995 survey included approximately 2,500 households. The second round, 
in 1997, was conducted using the 1995 sample and approximately 2,000 households were interviewed 
for both surveys. In 2001, another survey took place that included an identical section on food 
prices. Because of widespread internal migration, the sample used for the 1997 survey was no longer 
considered representative. The National Statistical Institute drew a new sample of 2,500 households 
from the pre-census listing of the 2001 Population Census. Prices on 34 food items, observed in each 
survey, are used in the analysis.23 Consequently, the sample constitutes a panel of communities and 
regions, rather than a panel of households. 
Information on all feasible trading partners is included for all spatial markets  . In 
particular, for each of Bulgaria’s nine administrative regions, representative prices are derived by 
finding the modal price for each commodity among the surveyed households of each region. For 
each commodity, representative prices are then matched to create region-to-region price pairs. 
Because the prices relate to observed purchases, we assume that associated inventory levels are not so 
low as to prohibit trade. Under the assumption that transaction costs are non-negative, trade is 
considered feasible when price distances, measured in logs, are positive. The nine regions yield 72 
location dyads for each year and 27 commodities. Not all commodities potentially trade between all 
dyads. Consequently, the process results in 1,988 observations overall that include 654 observations 
for 1995, 705 observations for 1997 and 629 observations for 2001.  
) , , ( c j i
Table 2 reports average price distances by region and by year. Very generally, the average 
calculated price distances fall from 1995 to 2001, although not in uniform fashion.24 
5  Empirical results 
As discussed in section 3, the variation in the price distances can be decomposed into between and 
within components using standard regression or analysis of variation techniques, under the 
assumption that the within-market-time effects are normally distributed. The composition of the 
sums-of-squares is reported in table 3.  Taken together, the between effects account for more than 
                                                 
23 The commodities are: beans, beer, bread, bulgar, cabbage, carrots, chicken, cucumbers, fresh milk, ground meat, honey, 
lamb, lard, lentils, margarine, oranges, pasta, pears, pork, rice, sausages, soft drinks, sweet peas, tomatoes, veal and beef, 
vegetable oil, and white cheese. 
24 A similar pattern can be observed for price distances based on commodity averages. See table S1 in the supplemental 
annex. 
  13two-thirds of the overall variation in the sample; however, most of this is from the variation in the 
between-market component,  , which reflects the variation in fixed location and commodity 
characteristics. The policies of interest are general in that they apply to all markets in the study, so 
our primary interest lies with how price differences change with time. The table suggests the change 
in average values which is captured by the between-time effects   is small relative to other 
sources of variation, including the within-time-market residual component, which contains 
information on how the slack variables vary with time. 
m s B ) (
m t B ) (
Key estimation and test results for the model are reported in table 4.25 Two of the tests have 
to do with the chosen specification. The first is a test of the composite-error assumption against the 
alternative that the errors are symmetrically distributed. The test is due to Schmidt and Lin (1984) 
and is especially useful since it can serve as the basis of a test of the composite-error assumption that 
is separate from additional assumptions about the specific form of the composed error. Coelli (1995) 
proposed a more convenient form of the test, used here, based on the observation that the residuals 
from an OLS regression will be skewed if the underlying model has a composite-error structure. The 
test score, reported in the table, takes the expected sign and is significant, lending support 
assumption that the residuals are a mix of random errors and non-negative slack variables. In the 
context of the conceptual model, the results are consistent with a distribution of market outcomes 
containing a mix of the conditions 3.1 and 3.2; the results are inconsistent with a set of markets 
dominated by missed arbitrage opportunities as described by equation 3.3 or by a set of fully 
integrated markets as described by 3.1 alone.  
The composite composition can be checked in the context of the estimated parameters as 
well. Note that if the sample contains both positive and negative slack variables in equal share, then 
the distribution of  st   would appear symmetric and it would be difficult to distinguish the variance 
of the two components of the composite error. In the context of the estimated model this does not 
appear to be the case. The estimated natural logs of the variances of  and  can be recovered 
directly from the estimated likelihood function and are reported in table 3. The estimated variance of 
the non-symmetric non-negative portion of the composite error,  , is large relative to the 
symmetric component  . A related test variance-composition test based on the ratio 








      e   declines, is 
reported in the last line of table 4. For the problem at hand, the statistic, which has a  
distribution, is significant. This is consistent with results from Coelli’s test reported above and the 
) 1 (
2 
                                                 
25 To save space, the large number of fixed-effect estimates associated with the market-commodity dyad, s(j,c) are not 
reported, but are available from the authors. 
  14assumption that the residuals contain a mix of non-negative and normally distributed stochastic 
terms. 
Estimated time-effects associated with the second (1997) and third (2001) surveys are also 
reported in the table. Because the first-period dummy is suppressed, the time effects can be 
interpreted as deviations from the 1995 round of surveys. The results suggest that average transfer 
costs fell between 1995 and 2001. The estimate associated with 1997 is positive, indicating that 
average transfer costs rose as the economy destabilized; however the associated z-score lies just 
outside a 10 percent level of significance. In contrast, a test based on the difference between the 1997 
and 2002 effects is statistically significant and indicates that average transfer costs fell from 1997 to 
2002.26 
As discussed, a concern in any type of test of the efficiency of spatial markets based on price 
pairs is that third markets influencing the price outcomes have been omitted from the analysis and 
that this omission potentially leads to inferential errors. Although we cannot compensate for 
information about markets that are missing, we test the sensitivity of the results to excluded markets 
in the context of the sample by randomly excluding some markets and repeating the analysis in a 
bootstrapping exercise. Results based on 200 replications are reported in table 3. The procedure 
inflates the standard errors of the respective time-effects, but conclusions based on the first set of 
standard-errors are not reversed. 
The model also provides estimates of the idiosyncratic slack variables, which together with 
information about relative price changes, can be used provide some insight about differences in 
individual market outcomes among the three periods. Recall from the earlier discussion that food 
market reforms of the type undertaken by Bulgaria are expected to lead potentially to different 
patterns of internal trade and to an improved integration of markets. For any given market pair and 
commodity, this might mean a reversal of trade flows or possibly a cessation of trade. In terms of the 
model, this might mean that the inequality   reverses or the value of the associated 
slack variable, 
) , 2 ( ) , 1 ( c p c p 
) , 2 , 1 ( c  , might switch from zero to a positive value or both changes might occur 
together. This makes the equilibrium outcome for any particular market pairing unpredictable. 
However, in general, market reforms are expected to reduce the disparity in spatial market outcomes, 
which, in turn, implies that the distribution of the idiosyncratic slack variables should shift toward 
zero. 
                                                 
26 Similar results hold for a fixed-effects OLS model, despite strong evidence against in favor of the composite error 
specification. See supplemental table S2. 
  15As discussed, the sample is unbalanced in that the same triads of commodity and location 
pairings do not appear in each survey round. This is potentially due to location-specific stock-outs, 
but is also reasonably attributed to sampling outcomes. The 1,988 observations are based on 939 
unique triads. Of these, 299 are observed in all survey rounds.27 Implied trade reversals are common. 
Among the 299 repeating triads, the location at which a higher price was observed switch in 124 
markets between 1995 and 1997 and in 115 markets between 1997 and 2001, with some markets 
switching between both periods. Implied unidirectional trade, as indicated by a constant inequality 
relationship, was a feature of only 124 triads. All of this suggests the potential for shifting trade 
patterns between the survey periods. 
Predicted values for the triad-specific slack variables were recovered from the estimated 
model. They are calculated as the expected value of the asymmetric component of the composite 
error, conditional on the jointly estimated symmetric error term, that is  . Two 
sample statistics from these predictions are reported in table 5 by survey year for the full sample and 
also for a sub-sample of the 299 repeating triads. The first is the average value of the slack variable. 
The second is the average squared value of the slack variable, which corresponds to the average 
squared distance from the trading frontier.  
] ˆ | [ ˆ
st dt st e E   
The predicted slack variables indicate that, once the fixed market effects and the time-
difference in transaction costs are taken into account, differences among the survey years in the 
average value of the slack variables are small. This is true of the overall sample and also of the sub-
sample of repeatedly observed markets. The distribution of the slack variables does appear to be 
more concentrated with time however, as the average squared distance measure falls. This indicates 
that with time, the distribution of slack variables became more concentrated and more closely 
bunched near zero. This can also be seen in figure 1, where the density distributions of the estimated 
slack variables of the repeating triads are graphed by survey year. The results are notionally consistent 
with improved market integration, as the tail of the distribution attenuates with time.  
Taken together, the estimation results indicate that food market performance improved on 
average as policies implemented in 1998 as average transfer costs fell and as a larger number of 
markets appeared to integrate.28 Even so, the results also indicate shifting trade patterns and a 
significant remaining heterogeneity in outcomes. 
                                                 
27 Of the remaining unique triads in the sample, 189 are observed once and 451 are observed twice. 
28 The finding complements results from a study by Feinberg and Meurs (2005). Using industry-level data, the authors 
provide evidence that market reforms in Bulgaria were associated with greater integration between domestic and 
international markets. 
  16Regional and commodity outcomes 
A key attribute of the model specification is that it provides a parametric test of how, in general, 
markets change over time. This is useful, since the tests provide a way to broadly evaluate the effects 
of policy. At the same time, the statistical test necessarily compresses information about 
heterogeneous local outcomes in order to judge a national trend. However, behind general trends 
heterogeneous local outcomes are expected since the determinants of transfer costs include factors 
that are specific to commodities and locations. 
As discussed, the applied model provides specific predictions for each commodity and 
market pair at each point in time. Because the market-commodity effects, s , are fixed and the time 
effects are common to all markets, predicted values are spatially heterogeneous, but rise and fall 
systematically with time due to the time-effects. However, associated with each observation are 
idiosyncratic predicted slack variables and these provide an additional component of spatial-temporal 
heterogeneity.  
The degree to which these sources of heterogeneity lead to different outcomes is illustrated 
in the regional and commodity averages of the predicted price distances given in tables 4 and 5. The 
predicted transfer costs suggest that the terms of trade between regions and the relative price of 
traded commodities were affected unevenly by both the disruptions of the late 1990s and the 
subsequent market reforms. For example, the model indicates that transfer costs fell from period to 
period in Sofia, albeit at differing rates. In contrast, transfer costs appeared to rise sharply and then 
decline sharply in Lovetch. The differences may be partly tied to the bundle of underlying 
commodities observed, since there is large variation in the average predicted transfer costs among 
commodities. For example, the predicted transfer costs associated with bread remained fairly 
constant, while many of the predicted transfer costs associated with fresh vegetables changed more 
dramatically.  Collectively, these results illustrate that outcomes from the changes in policy regimes 
were disparate, even though market performance improved on average in measurable ways. 
6  Conclusions 
Following widespread economic disorder, the Government of Bulgaria began in 1998 a series of 
market reforms that included a retreat from previous interventions in domestic food markets. 
Though the new policies relied heavily on markets, few direct steps were taken to build up the 
institutions and practices upon which markets depend. Nevertheless, results from the previous 
section provide evidence that spatial food market performance improved in Bulgaria between 1997 
and 2001 following a period of consistent and market-reliant food and transport policies and that 
food markets functioned better in 2001 than in 1995. Moreover, while the results indicate the 
  17importance of macroeconomic stability for food market performance, there is no evidence to suggest 
that the observed changes in market margins simply marked a return to earlier performance levels 
following the economic disruptions of 1996. 
Because the improvement in market performance coincided with the introduction of market-
reliant reforms and consistent food policy, but took place during a period when related institutions 
were judged to be weak, the finding is consistent with the notion that some market institutions are 
endogenous and that, in some cases, there are measurable benefits to consistent policies alone. This 
speaks against delaying reforms until market-backing public institutions are judged to be strong. 
Even so, the estimated changes in market performance are spatially uneven and it may well 
be the case that this measured heterogeneity is partly related to an uneven evolution of market 
institutions and related public investments. To the extent this is so, the results suggest that the weak 
performance of institutions can contribute to an unintended consequences in the distribution of the 
benefits and costs of reform. Moreover, when privately provided institutions are inferior to public 
institutions, any potential gains from good policy will be constrained. Consequently, policy makers 
will need to strike a difficult balance of pacing reforms, building up supporting market institutions 
and putting in place safety nets where markets are weak. 
From a methodological perspective, the results suggest heterogeneous rates of market 
development, as expressed in the idiosyncratic components of the model. Consequently, methods 
that impose a fixed dynamic on how prices adjust to policy may produce misleading results. 
Moreover, the observed pattern of relative price changes and the predicted differences in relative 
transaction costs are consistent with shifting patterns of internal trade. This is especially important 
since many studies of spatial markets rely on observations over time of a limited number of markets 
and on time series approaches where fixed rates of adjustment are assumed. 
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Table 1: Transition and performance indicators. 
Transition  indicators  1995 1997 2001 
Privatization  2.33 2.78 3.22 
Finance  2.00 2.34 2.50 
Infrastructure  1.33 2.00 2.67 
Market reforms  3.34 4.00 4.33 
  Trade  4.00  4.00  4.33 
  Domestic prices  2.67  4.00  4.33 
  Competition  2.00  2.33  2.33 
Performance indicators     
Phone lines (per thousand)  307.60 330.97 560.94 
Inflation rate  62.05 1,058.37  7.36 
Source: EBRD (2007); World Bank (2008). 
 
Table 2: Average price distances by region and year 
Region 1995  1997  2001 
Bourgass  0.289 0.293 0.259 
Haskovo  0.221 0.397 0.187 
Lovetch  0.215 0.311 0.196 
Montana  0.353 0.310 0.166 
Plovdiv  0.308 0.307 0.265 
Rousse  0.389 0.306 0.207 
Sofia  city  0.443 0.345 0.294 
Sofia  region  0.262 0.286 0.213 
Varna  0.318 0.337 0.262 
Average  0.321 0.323 0.233 
Observations 654 705 629 
Source: Bulgaria Integrated Household Surveys and authors’ calculations.   
 
Table 3: Analysis of variance for price distances 
 Partial  sum-of-squares Share 
Between effects  80.73a 0.69 
Time, B(t) 2.29a 0.02 
Markets, B(s) 77.33b 0.67 
Within time-markets, W(st) 35.43  0.31 
Total 116.16  1.00 
a and b denotes significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels respectively. 
 
  21Table 4: Selected estimation results and test-scores. 
Estimated time effects  Parameter  z-score 
Estimates   Sample  Bootstrap 
 1997  0.016 1.62 0.75 
 2001  -0.085a -8.00 -3.65 
Tests      
Time effects are equal      
 1997 =  2001  0.101a 9.67 4.29 
Slack variables are symmetric      
Coelli skewness test  5.30a    
Variance composition test, 2(1)  1,324a    
*denotes significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
Table 5: Predicted slack variables by survey year 
  Full sample  Repeating markets 
Survey year  Mean  Squared 
distance  Mean  Squared 
distance 
1995  0.084   0.054   0.111   0.066  
1997  0.076   0.033   0.106   0.044  
2001  0.077   0.023   0.107   0.031  
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Figure 1: Model components 
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Table 6: Estimated transfer costs by region and survey year. 
Region 1995  1997  2001 
Bourgass 0.234  0.231  0.140 
Haskovo 0.211  0.297  0.141 
Lovetch 0.190  0.255  0.162 
Montana 0.267  0.274  0.101 
Plovdiv 0.234  0.239  0.184 
Rousse 0.261  0.232  0.202 
Sofia city  0.274  0.252  0.165 
Sofia region  0.209  0.216  0.150 
Varna 0.227  0.230  0.158 
Average  0.236 0.247 0.156 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Table 7: Estimated transfer costs, by commodity and year 
Commodity 1995 1997 2001 
beans 0.248  0.204  0.125 
beer 0.231  0.293  0.134 
bread 0.178  0.169  0.146 
bulgar 0.361  0.322  0.189 
cabbage 0.309  0.268  0.215 
carrots 0.455  0.479  0.213 
chicken 0.080  0.171  0.034 
cucumbers 0.374  0.408  0.165 
fresh milk  0.262  0.282  0.210 
ground meat  0.080 0.143 0.005 
honey 0.321  0.327  0.253 
lamb 0.168  0.226  0.099 
lard 0.374  0.427  0.381 
lentils 0.261  0.233  0.093 
margarine 0.091  0.115  0.021 
oranges 0.215  0.283  0.152 
pasta 0.199  0.227  0.190 
pears 0.128  0.192  0.085 
pork 0.082  0.152  0.081 
rice 0.117  0.113  0.050 
sausages 0.081  0.135  0.032 
soft drinks  0.444  0.330  0.482 
sweet peas  0.253  0.242  0.190 
tomatoes 0.329  0.311  0.095 
veal and beef  0.182  0.128  0.126 
vegetable oil  0.174  0.183  0.101 
white cheese  0.172  0.180  0.107 
Average  0.236 0.247 0.156 
Note: Authors’ calculations 
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Supplemental tables 
 
Table S1: Average price distances by commodity and year 
Commodity 1995  1997  2001 
beans  0.333 0.226 0.149 
beer  0.261 0.364 0.209 
bread  0.218 0.189 0.235 
bulgar  0.409 0.364 0.291 
cabbage  0.643 0.268 0.229 
carrots  0.698 0.792 0.221 
chicken  0.087 0.207 0.051 
cucumbers  0.480 0.485 0.303 
fresh  milk  0.262 0.288 0.408 
ground meat  0.085 0.204 0.051 
honey  0.356 0.355 0.341 
lamb  0.193 0.324 0.116 
lard  0.445 0.527 0.511 
lentils  0.312 0.314 0.105 
margarine  0.097 0.124 0.154 
oranges  0.219 0.382 0.182 
pasta  0.473 0.344 0.235 
pears  0.128 0.387 0.105 
pork  0.086 0.186 0.180 
rice  0.162 0.113 0.113 
sausages  0.082 0.215 0.238 
soft  drinks  0.837 0.408 0.552 
sweet  peas  0.288 0.302 0.374 
tomatoes  0.499 0.428 0.124 
veal and beef  0.204  0.148  0.260 
vegetable  oil 0.182 0.384 0.112 
white  cheese 0.212 0.182 0.131 
Total  0.321 0.323 0.233 
Source: Bulgaria Integrated Household Surveys and authors’ calculations.   
 
Table S2: Selected OLS estimation results and test-scores. 
   Sample  Bootstrap 
Estimated time effects  Parameter  t-score  z-score 
 1997  0.010 0.56  0.40 
 2001  -0.095a -5.36  -4.01 
Tests     
Time effects are equal     
 1997 =  2001  0.105a  6.04 5.37 
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Table S3: Observed markets by year of survey 
  Survey year 
Classifications  1995 1997 2001 
All  markets  654 705 629 
Repeating location-commodity 
combinations 
299 299 299 
Implied trade direction reversals    124  115 
Repeating unidirectional  markets 124 124 124 
 